About the maps (page 2) :

Production of Trench Maps in the Field.
With printing facilities available at Imbros in the form of the combined ANZAC and British Printing Sections under Lieut. Nicholas, it was possible for tactical maps with defence information. Once it was realised that a rapid breakthrough of the Turkish defences was not imminent, it was considered necessary to create large-scale trench diagrams (the planimetry could not initially be made accurate enough to dignify them with the name of maps or plans). The first step was to produce a reasonably accurate large-scale topographical map onto which trenches could be plotted from air photographs. An ungridded 1:25,000 black contoured map of the Helles — Krithia area (Ptg Section, GHQ, MEF Z.2015) was soon reproduced from captured material. One copy shows British and Turkish trenches in MS to the west of Krithia. A black 1:10,000 contoured sheet was produced entitled ‘Map of Area occupied by Australian & N.Z. Army Corps, enlarged from a Turkish map.’ It is difficult to date many of the maps of this theatre because neither the Survey of Egypt nor the Printing Section at GHQ, MEF, dated its maps until trench editions began to be printed in the summer; even then, a number remained undated. Tentative datings can, however, be made by reference to the tactical situation as shown by trenches, and to MS additions.

Maps for the Suvla landing.
The Suvla operation, at first a mere afterthought to a big attack from Anzac and mostly planned, like the April landings, by Aspinall, Dawnay and Deedes, was cloaked in such secrecy that several senior officers remained unbriefed until 30 July, and many didn’t see a map before the landing, and ground reconnaissance and low-level reconnaissance flights were forbidden. The Suvla area was weakly fortified by the Turks and there were no continuous lines of trenches. Nevertheless the British prepared ‘dispositions’ maps or traces showing what Turkish defences had been located by air photography. The Final Instructions issued on 29 July from GHQ to IX Corps for the Suvla Operations make a specific reference to ‘an aeroplane photograph [which] has also disclosed the presence of a few trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches [not reproduced in Official History], which have apparently been constructed for some months is attached.’ British company commanders were only issued with maps at Mudros at 2.30pm on the eve of the assault. The troops relied on the 1:20,000 map for the landing, as the Turkish defences were almost non-existent, so no formal trench map or positions map was printed or issued. Trench maps were made after the landing, as the Turkish defence firmed up and British troops dug in.

The Turkish force (the Anafarta Detachment) defending Suvla, commanded by the Bavarian Major Willmer, comprised 4 battalions, no machine guns, little barbed wire and a few pieces of artillery (which he made the most of by changing positions frequently and also using dummy guns). He had established strong points on the Kiretch Tepe, Hill 10 and Chocolate Hill, and Lala Baba was entrenched and piqueted by a look-out party. His main force was in a line about a mile north of the W Hills, parallel with the sea, barring the way to Tekke Tepe.

For the Suvla operation, the RNAS aeroplane unit flew from its new airfield on Imbros, brief high-altitude reconnaissance flights being made for security reasons. On 4 August Capt. A. A. Walser noted all existing trenches and gun emplacements (most of which he identified as unoccupied), made a sketch of the position from the air, and handed this to GHQ. The next day 2nd Lieut. the Hon. M. H. R. Knatchbull-Hugessen confirmed the information about the gun emplacements and reported that the trenches north of the Salt Lake were unoccupied. Detailed photos were taken of the Chocolate Hill defences, one of the landing’s first objectives. On 6 June, the only enemy troops seen were moving away from the area!

In the area of the British and New Zealanders’ attack from Anzac, there were old shallow Turkish trench on the summit of Chunuk Bair, severely damaged by the British naval bombardment. The First Instructions from GHQ to IX Corps, dated 22 July, noted that ‘Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this [the Chunuk Bair] ridge, do not extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength.’ For their associated Lone Pine attack at Anzac, the Australians had prepared an accurate, detailed map of the position from the excellent air photos now available (such trench maps had been prepared and improved ever since the first landings in April, although at first the lack of air photos delayed progress). Unfortunately the photos were poorly interpreted, the timber cover, showing clearly on the photos, of the Turkish front trenches remaining unidentified, and a steep ravine (later called The Cup, in which the Turkish headquarters and reserves were situated, forming the main communication with the front on the left of the Lone Pine position) branching from Owen’s Gully, was not appreciated by the Intelligence staff evaluating the photos; the reverse slopes of this ravine were untrenched, and a breakthrough here would have led directly into open country.

MACEDONIA (SALONIKA FRONT).
It should be noted that from the outset in 1915 the allied force at Salonika was under a French commander-in-chief. This was of great importance for survey and mapping at a later stage when, as we shall see, a coordinated mapping policy was agreed and enforced. At the beginning, however, the British and French conducted their surveys and mapping prectically independently of each other. When the British Salonika Force (BSF) landed, the War Office in London (GSGS) supplied copies (series GSGS 3110: black detail and contours, blue water, red roads and tracks) of the sheets of the 1:200,000 Austro-Hungarian General Staff map of south-eastern Europe which covered Macedonia; this was inaccurate and useless for artillery work and the planning of defensive positions, roads, etc. This was used as a basis for compiling the War Office 1:250,000 map and also the Admiralty War Staff 1:400,000 map. The Austrian map was indispensable, the allies relying on it and its derivatives entirely in the event of any considerable advance. Nevertheless, it was most inaccurate in the very area of southern Macedonia where the allies found themselves, one Austrian survey officer apparently sending villagers to pace distances for him while he enjoyed the local wine; enlargements from it were practically useless. Bulgaria was covered by recent (c1912) 1:40,000 and 1:126,000 series of that country’s national survey, the latter series not being very accurate. The old Austrian General Staff 1:200,000 sheets covering Bulgaria were considered to be ‘extremely sketchy and of doubtful reliability.’

After the early retirement to the Entrenched Camp of Salonika it was decided, because of the paucity of good maps, to begin a new survey. A complete survey unit was not provided for the force in 1915, despite the fact that trained surveyors were in the theatre in RE works units, so there were no reliable maps or accurate data for the artillery in 1915-16, except that supplied by the French force. A Topographical Section of the Royal Engineers was sent out from Egypt, arriving on 28 December 1915., and was first employed until March 1916 on surveys of the defended area of Salonika. ‘A’ Printing Section RE left the Dardanelles Army HQ at Imbros on 26 January 1916, arriving at the Salonika Army HQ on 28 January. It had been preceded by an Advanced Party on 6 January. Part of the ANZAC Printing Section which had been attached to the Section at Imbros went with it to Salonika. These Sections were later combined into a Maps and Survey Section, which compiled a map of the Salonika defences from surveys by Capt. Meldrum (of the Topographical Section), a French Survey Section, etc. This Maps and Survey Section later became the nucleus of a Field Survey Company. A Meteor Section was also formed, in October 1915, and this continued until April 1919.

The French produced 1:50,000 scale sheets of their area, and 1:20,000 sheets of the country close to the front line; these were handed over to the British when the latter took over that sector, explaining the existence on British maps up to the end of the war of French names (Petit Couronné, Piton Rocheux, Les Bagatelles, etc.). Following Major Wood’s reorganisation of survey work in early 1917, the British produced, complying with an inter-allied agreement, new 1:50,000 and 1:20,000 sheets of the area east of the French, on sheetlines and to a specification determined by the French.

In March 1916, most of the Topographical Section were engaged on a special reconnaissance from Stavros to Cerpande, east of Kavala, and around the Drama district. In June — August a special survey was made from the mouth of the Struma to Lake Doiran. On 1 September 1916 the Section was ordered to carry out a 1:10,000 survey of the enemy front from Doiran to the Vardar river, this being competed on 1 October. The Section then went to the Struma sector to survey the Bulgarian positions, this work continuing into November. Meldrum was awarded the DSO for his survey work (gazetted 23 November 1916).

The inaccuracy of the existing 1:200,000 maps (old Austro-Hungarian staff maps) led to immense demands for mapping which it was impossible for the Topographical Section to fulfil, so a Maps and Survey Section RE was formed in January 1916 (official date of establishment 28 August 1916). All the executive work connected with the Topo Section and the distribution of maps to all units of the Salonika Army was undertaken by the Maps & Survey Section. Its function was to compile large-scale maps from air photos, to make diagrams and plans for the General Staff, and to help in the compilation of maps from plane-table sheets sent in from the field.

When the force advanced to the frontier with Bulgaria, new survey was necessary to create a reliable triangulation as a basis for better maps and flash-spotting and sound-ranging to locate enemy guns could be done for the artillery. A new RE Survey Company BSF (later 8th Field Survey Company) was therefore belatedly formed on 18 February 1917, from the existing Topographical, Survey & Mapping, and Printing Sections in Salonika, under the command of Major (later Lt.-Col.) Henry Wood RE of the Survey of India, who was sent by the War Office to take control of the rather chaotic survey work in Macedonia and organise a Field Survey Company (first called the Salonika Survey Company) for the British Salonika Force.

Faced with producing new series of 1:50,000 and 1:20,000 sheets on the sheetlines and projection adopted by the French, Wood realised that the existing triangulation was unreliable, so he organised a systematic new triangulation survey, founded on a new base and utilising as many of the old stations as possible to enable the old triangulation to be recomputed. He began fieldwork in June 1917. From this base a new main triangulation net was extended over the whole British front. Topographical mapping for the new survey was started at the beginning of 1917, the British area being plane-tabled while, for the enemy area, air photos were hung onto a net of intersected points.

The Official Historian noted of survey in Macedoania that in mid-1917: ‘it became obvious that, in view of the decision to employ sound-ranging for the location of hostile battery positions [as recorded in Chapter III, two sound-ranging sections arrived in January 1918 . . . ‘The sound-ranging sections from England and an improvised flash-spotting section were subsequently incorporated in No. 8 Field Survey Company, which then carried out all the functions of a similar unit in France.’], there would be a demand for improved maps and for battery-boards, such as were provided for the artillery by the field survey companies on the Western Front. Major Wood reported that the staff of the topographical sections suffered from lack of experience in the use of the plane-table; in three months the output had been 400 square miles on the 1/50,000 scale, whereas in his view a thoroughly efficient staff could have done nearly three times as much. Less than one third of the British area had then been surveyed on this scale; and the 1/50,000 sheets for the remainder had been produced partly by enlargement of the Austrian staff map and of a rough 1/100,000 map covering part of this area which had been made by the British, and partly from air photographs and cavalry reconnaissances. At this rate of progress it would have taken years to complete the survey.

Major Wood therefore advised the General Staff that application should be made to India, which had available large numbers of highly qualified surveyors. The War Office agreed, but it was not until the 23rd October 1917 that a survey detachment from the Survey of India, consisting of a British officer and nine Indian surveyors, with orderlies and followers, arrived at Salonika. The Indian detachment then took over the survey completely, while the British sections, reduced to one containing only the best men, began the accurate fixation of batteries and observation posts and the preparation of battery-boards in the area of the XII Corps. Some maps of country behind the enemy’s lines were also produced, based on skeleton surveys from observation posts into which air photographs were fitted, and also on data supplied by the Greek Government, which had begun a survey during the short period between the end of the Second Balkan War and the outbreak of the Great War. For the country beyond the crest of the Belaica Planina and the Bulgarian frontier east of the Struma, it was decided to rely upon the Austrian staff map and the British adaptions from it. These adaptions included not only the War Office and Admiralty maps mentioned above, but also, for the Strumica valley, rough 1/100,000 sheets, which were produced just before the final offensive.’

During the winter of 1917-18, Lieuts H. B. Symons and B. T. Wyatt brought detachments of Indian topographers and draughtsmen from India. Major R. H. Phillimore (also of the Survey of India) arrived from France on 2 April 1918 to take command of work in XII Corps area and to coordinate the results of the work of the observation groups and sound-ranging sections. There was already an Observation Section, under XII Corps Heavy Artillery, in the theatre. Much of the work was to assist the artillery, either by fixing their own battery positions and aiming points, or by fixing observation posts and helping to locate enemy batteries and other targets; officers were sent to France to be trained in sound-ranging, and two sound-ranging sections (‘Q’ and ‘X’ Sections) were sent out from France at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. An Observation (flash-spotting) Group (No. 26), comprising 2 officers and 64 other ranks was sent from Italy, arriving on 30 May 1918. Together with ‘Q’ Section, the original Observation Section was transferred to the FSC on 21 March 1918. The Company became the 8th Field Survey Company on 4 May 1918.

The mapping gradually improved during 1917, but reliable and finished maps were only available in January 1918; these were at least as accurate as the French maps and, according to the British, superior in clarity. By the time of the armistice on this front (October 1918), apart from all the map production, the Company had surveyed 1,500 square miles of triangulation, 2,200 square miles of good topography, and had completed the compilation of air photos along 100 miles of front. Some of the maps of the Balkans used by the Salonika army in its final offensive were printed at the printing works at Damascus occupied by 7th FSC on 4 October. During the final advance in late-1918, the Indian plane-tablers excelled at the rapid exploratory surveys for which they were famous, and the Company joined up its surveys with those of the Germans. 8th FSC proceeded to Constantinople, where it found and collated a huge amount of German and Turkish work.

‘The British survey’s history was thus like that of many British improvisations in time of war. Map-making began with the handicap of indifferent apparatus and lack of expert knowledge, so that it was for a long time far behind that of the French in efficiency. Finally, however, it may be said that it not only caught up but went ahead. The later British work was at last equal in accuracy to the French; in clarity it was distinctly superior, and some of the sheets were really handsome examples of the draughtsman’s art.’

Note on 8th FSC War Diary (PRO WO 95 4803).
This is an excellent War Diary, most of it apparently written by Wood himself or his adjutant. It includes an Index Chart of 1:50,000 and 1:20,000 sheets (Survey Coy, RE, BSF, 16-4-17), and a 3-page printed leaflet:
‘The British Triangulation in Macedonia 1916-1918’ (8th FSC, 1366/100, 22-11-18) which includes brief details of German triangulation work. It also includes a coloured 1:400,000 index map (2nd Edn) of the Balkans (8th FSC 435, 1-6-18) showing the state of survey in various areas.

EGYPT & PALESTINE.
Prior to the war, maps of Egypt (occupied by the British since 1882) had been the responsibility of the Survey of Egypt under E. M. Dowson, while Turkish-occupied Palestine had been partially surveyed, and mapped at the 1-inch scale, in the late-19th Century by the Palestine Exploration Fund, based in London. In August 1914, good maps existed of the Suez Canal region, and Captain S. F. Newcombe RE had 5 survey parties working in the Sinai peninsular; RE officers, working in conjunction with the Survey of Egypt, had been surveying the Sinai peninsular over several winter seasons.

T. E. Lawrence, who had already spent some years in the Middle East, and who in January and February 1914 had spent six weeks with Leonard Woolley working, under archaeological cover, with Newcombe’s team on a clandestine reconnaissance survey of tracks and water holes in the Sinai desert in order to determine the likely route of a Turkish advance towards Egypt, came out to Egypt in December 1914 after a brief training period in the GSGS, War Office, in London. Lawrence had returned to England in June 1914, and when war broke out tried to join the OTC in Oxford. He was not accepted, and neither was he welcomed in London because the flood of volunteers was so great so, after trying in vain to get a war job through Newcombe he wrote to the archaeologist D. G. Hogarth, Keeper of the Ashmolean and a member of the RGS. Hogarth had, in 1910, fixed Lawrence up with a job on a British Museum dig at Carchemish on the Euphrates, and now, in 1914, he was instrumental in obtaining, as a special favour of Colonel W. C. Hedley (i/c GSGS), a week’s trial for him in the GSGS. Lawrence had been working there for three weeks when Hogarth asked Hedley if he had been any use; the latter replied that he was running the whole department! Under Hedley, Lawrence worked on a large-scale map and handbook of Sinai, but also on Belgium and France. Early in December 1914, on Turkey entering the war on the side of Germany, Kitchener, realising the value of their knowledge in planning Egypt’s defence, sent the members of the Sinai Survey expedition to join the new Intelligence Department in Cairo, Lawrence going as a 2nd Lieutenant to the Military Map Department with special responsibility for liaising with the Survey of Egypt.

During the campaign, Colonel Hedley made sure that experience gained on other fronts — notably the Western Front — was available to the E.E.F. and ensured coordination. This was particularly the case with map scales and the squaring system, and with enemy-battery-location through flash-spotting and sound-ranging. Colonel W. V. Nugent RA (an old boundary commissioner who had also served in the GSGS in London and in the field commanding a Ranging and Survey Section at Gallipoli) of the General Staff gave valuable technical advice. Wavell noted that the best map of the theatre available was the survey made by Kitchener in 1878 when he was an RE subaltern, which was ‘excellent as far as it went, but the detail was not always sufficiently accurate for tactical purposes.’ Wavell also criticised the maps available during the campaign. Describing the attack of the 52nd Division north of Gaza on 8 November 1917, he stated that ‘in this as in other operations at the time the lack of accurate maps was much felt. Later, dealing with the first attempt to capture Jerusalem, he noted that
‘accurate maps of the country toward Jerusalem were lacking.’

The compilation of the Sinai maps, ‘in process of being ignored,’ was expedited during the autumn of 1914, and sections of Survey of Egypt surveyors, under Captain Russell, created a series of 1:15,000 artillery maps of a strip of territory east of the Canal. In the early days of the campaign the Survey of Egypt provided invaluable help to the army, and provided the first officers and other ranks when the army formed its own survey organisation - in October 1915 a strong Topographical Section RE was formed under Major W. J. Maule, comprising 9 officers commissioned from the Survey of Egypt and Egyptian other ranks. Six field parties of this Section extended the 1:15,000 Canal Zone maps into Sinai, this survey later being replotted and continued at 1:20,000 scale. It proved very valuable. By the end of the campaign in 1918, most of the 39 officers then serving with 7th Field Survey Company (as the Topographical Section had become) had been transferred or attached from British or Australian units.

By the end of February 1916, British reconnaissance forces were advancing into the desert east of the Canal, the Qatiya area was clear of Turks, and Maule’s topographical parties, protected by Yeomanry and the Camel Corps, began to extend the 1:15,000 survey. This reached the Dueidar area early in March, and by May was almost at Qatiya. The Topo Section continued its survey work after El Arish had been captured, and in March 1917 large-scale mapping was begun again as part of the preparations for the First Battle of Gaza (26-27 March), nearly 100 square miles of the coastal belt being surveyed. On 14 March 1917 the Section was expanded to become 7th Field Survey Company RE. On 1 April the Company moved forward from El Arish to Khan Yunis, remained there a week, and then on to Deir el Balah. The first fortnight of April saw it making detailed surveys of a further 100 square miles between Rafah and Gaza. On 18 April the Printing Section issued copies of a partly contoured 1:40,000 sheet for this area.

Before the Second Battle of Gaza (17-19 April 1917) a series of 1:15,000 sketch maps based on air photos, a 1:7,500 trench map of the Gaza area, artillery maps and photo-panoramas were issued among others. On 22 April, 8 surveyors started work on a 1:20,000 map of the area east of Wadi Ghazzee, and a more detailed 1:10,000 series was soon started. This latter series, based on ground survey supplemented by air photos, showed all Turkish trench systems, wire and batteries. Field parties executed triangulation, plane-table survey including contouring, intersected points in and beyond the Turkish lines, and fixed battery positions and datum points for the artillery. They also accompanied all reconnaissances in force towards the more easterly trench systems and Beersheba, fixing points ahead for the artillery and for the compilation of maps from air photos. Officers in charge of field sections kept in close touch with divisions and brigades, supplying them with advanced tracings of new or special areas surveyed. The series was continuously revised as the Turks extended their positions, 39 editions of the 17 sheets being issued. The heavy revision work entailed led to the dropping of this scale in July when the trench map was replotted at 1:20,000. 18 sheets, covering 685 square miles (282 of which were surveyed on the ground and 403 compiled from air photos), were issued before Third Gaza in 28 editions, 9 of them by the Survey of Egypt in Cairo and 19 by 7th FSC’s Printing Section which also reproduced a wide range of maps and plans for formation HQs.

Air survey was an important innovation in this theatre. The Royal and Australian Flying Corps took air photos regularly over the Turkish trench lines and beyond, copies being supplied to 7th FSC which compiled many maps completely from this source on the basis of intersected points and good detail on the existing maps. An officer under GS (I) studied all photos and indicated all enemy defence works and details of military importance which were then plotted on the maps. Enemy battery positions and other important targets were plotted at once, and coordinates supplied to him for passing on to the artillery.

During April the half-inch (1:125,000) map of the Sinai peninsular was revised, and a 1:30,000 map was made of the Aqaba district. Immediately following Second Gaza, a series of contoured 1:40,000 maps of the coastal strip of northern Sinai as far as Rafa was issued before July, and work on this scale continued later up to the Turkish defences of the Beersheba — Gaza line. In view of the likelihood of the mapping being extended into Palestine and Trans-Jordania, and a possible future link with the Mesopotamia survey being carried up the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, two bases were accurately measured to serve a new triangulation, detail being completed by plane-table and stereoscopic air photos (which were mainly used for contouring as they gave a good impression of ground-forms). At the front a series of points was intersected behind the Turkish lines to create a basis for extending the triangulation into Palestine. On 28 June 1917 all the available field survey parties accompanied the Australian Mounted Division towards Beersheba, and on 4 and 8 July made two rapid but detailed reconnaissance surveys of the area north-west of the town. The compilation of maps from survey and photographs, and fair drawing ready for reproduction, were done at 7th FSC HQ. In June 1917 a powered litho machine was installed at Rafa for rapid printing of maps. Printed sheets as far as Rafah were issued by 7th FSC in July 1917, and by mid-August the rest of the area between Beersheba and the sea, including all enemy trenches, was nearly all covered by the preparation of 9 more sheets. Owing to the large number of 1:10,000 scale sheets required to cover the whole line of trench systems, the 1:20,000 scale was adopted and 18 sheets were prepared in 28 editions, 9 of them by 7th FSC.

Before Third Gaza, 7th FSC’s Printing Section prepared and issued maps and trench diagrams up to the eve of the battle, the largest group of maps being that giving Turkish gun positions of which 629 had been located by the sound-ranging sections. Using these data, 24 active-hostile-battery shoots were made against the more active of these. Following Third Gaza, with the resumption of open warfare, the demand increased for smaller-scale maps covering larger areas, and large numbers of 1:100,000 - 1:500,000 sheets were printed and issued. Disposition maps were often reproduced by sun-printing or photography to save time. Detailed surveys were not executed during the advance through Philistia, but the triangulation was continued along the axis Hebron — Jerusalem and along the coastal plain to Jaffa (where a check-base was measured and the triangulation connected with Jerusalem. Following the stabilisation of the front, a detailed survey was executed along a 5-mile wide belt from the Jordan to the sea; this was carried close to the Turkish positions in several places, and many points behind the Turkish lines were fixed by intersection.

At this stage detailed four-colour maps were first plotted at 1:20,000, and later at 1:40,000, and contoured at 20-metre vertical interval in the hills and 10-metres elsewhere, with spot-height; such precise height data were essential for the artillery to set an accurate angle-of-sight when laying their guns. Overprinted sheets showing located targets were issued to the artillery and special surveys of roads and communications were made. By the end of 1917 nearly 40 square miles of sketch surveys and 51 square miles of detailed surveys of the forward area had been issued. Between 1 January 1918 and the start of the final offensive, 1,569 square miles of detailed survey, 124 square miles of sketch survey and 51 miles of road revision survey were made. July 1918 saw the heaviest work, 405 square miles of detail survey being executed.

In February 1918 the Company’s Lithographic and Letterpress Sections, which printed topographical maps, intelligence summaries, enemy disposition maps, handbooks and reports, moved to Ramle. Many telephoto panoramas were taken of the ground occupied by the Turks, and large numbers of air photos were used in map compilation. The volume of printing peaked in September. In August two Corps Topo Sections were added to 7th FSC for XX and XXI Corps HQs, where they compiled and printed small (brief size: 13 x 16 inches) duplicated 5-colour maps of enemy dispositions based on air photos and Intelligence reports; on occasions several hundred copies were issued within 24 hours of receiving new information. In a 7 week period 8,800 copies of 32 maps were issued, including 5 special 1:10,000 sheets of the Turkish defences in the coastal sector. The Lithographic and Letterpress Sections issued over 120,000 publications, including geological pamphlets, and printed and issued 123,000 maps before the armistice.

In October and November 1918, 7th FSC made detailed surveys of 216 square miles, and detachments under Captain Bamford soon reached Beirut and Damascus (taking over the printing works at the latter on 4 October); some of the maps of the Balkans used by the Salonika Army in its final offensive were printed here! Little topographical work was done during December, but the latitude and longitude of Damascus and other places were determined by astronomical observations and a survey party sent to the Hejaz similarly fixed several places on the railway. To assist this work, wireless time signals were received from Paris and Berlin.

Immediately after the start of the final operations, the Palestine triangulation was extended into Syria by two parties, one working along the Nablus road and the other along the coastal plain and through the foothills, from where the survey was carried on a single belt through Nazareth to Damascus. In June a check on a Turkish base at Aleppo linked the Palestine and Syria survey with the triangulation carried by Major Lewis RE from Basra through Bagdad to Syria. This joint triangulation was over 1,400 miles long, and was followed by detailed plane-table survey and air photography which was plotted at 1:40,000. During January and February 1919 some 750 square miles were surveyed and over the next three months 2,150 square miles in the Damascus and Aleppo areas were covered.

In Palestine an area of 1,473 square miles between the Beersheba — Gaza line and the front held during the summer of 1918 was surveyed before the armistice and subsequently a further 8,500 square miles were surveyed, all of which was plotted at 1:40,000. Another 7,000 square miles in Syria and Transjordania were surveyed and plotted at 1:100,000 in 1919. The use of air photography to supplement ground work was more extensive in this theatre than in others, and in 1918 alone nearly 16,000 air photos were taken.

Early in 1919 the meteor Station at Jerusalem was handed over. The new peace organisation was settled in March 1919 and in July Lt.-Col. S. F. Newcombe, returning from Turkish captivity, took over command of 7th FSC. On 1 August Company HQ moved to Damascus and detailed survey was started in the Homs area. The Company was disbanded on 24 November 1919, Newcombe being appointed Survey Officer, Palestine (which became a British Mandate under the League of Nations).

Artillery Survey work of 7th FSC.
As in France, most survey work was focussed on the needs of the artillery, which demanded more and more accurate survey for target location. In May 1917 an improvised flash-spotting section began experimenting with the location of Turkish gun positions, but the results suffered from Turkish reluctance to fire at night. In August two sound-ranging sections joined 7th FSC at Deir el Balah — ‘N’ Section (Capt. Gott RFA) being attached to XXI Corps and ‘V’ Section (Capt. Cockburn RCE) to XX Corps. The first enemy gun position was plotted on 15 September, and by the end of September 166 guns had been located between Atawineh and the sea. In June a Meteor Section, under Lieut. Bamford, was added to 7th FSC.

Sound-ranging was inappropriate for a brief period after Third Gaza due to the rapid forward movement, and even after the front stabilised it was handicapped until April by bad weather. Thereafter conditions were generally good and much useful location work was done for the artillery. In April the Meteor Section opened a second station at Jerusalem to obtain a wider range of weather and forecasting data. Later in 1918 pilot balloon observation began and corrections were calculated and used for the artillery.

A third sound-ranging section (‘NN’ Section) was formed in August 1918, occupying a fourth base in the foothills. Before the final offensive (Battle of Megiddo — 19 September 1918) the three sound-ranging sections located almost every Turkish gun position in a belt 5-miles deep along a 37-mile front, and some preliminary shoots were made against plotted locations. Following the pattern developed to achieve surprise in France, the coastal sector was left almost undisturbed until the attack opened when, as a result of ‘N’ Section’s work, the enemy artillery was almost completely neutralised.

Flash-spotting was begun in the foothills by No. 28 Observation Group, which arrived from France in August, but as the Turkish artillery seldom fired by day and almost never at night, little opportunity occurred for locating guns by this method.

MESOPOTAMIA (IRAQ).
Survey work in Mesopotamia was provided by the Survey of India, whose operations spread into parts of Syria, Kurdistan and Persia. The most important work was a regular topographical survey based on triangulation in Greenwich terms, eventually connected to Russian surveys in the north and the Egyptian surveys in the west. This survey followed the progress of the armies in the field, covering the country as it was freed from Turkish occupation. It included town surveys on scales as large as 48-inches to the mile (1:1,320) and precise levelling operations.

Despite the strategic importance of the area, not least as the source of oil for Britain’s battle fleet, in 1914 few maps of Mesopotamia existed, and these were so small-scale, inaccurate and lacking in detail as to be of little military value. The were no triangulation systems in place before the war, but a Survey of India detachment was on the ground with the Turko — Persian Boundary Commission, and by the time war broke out they had demarcated the frontier from the Muhammarah to Urumieh. Turkey initially remaining neutral they carried on to finish the work at Ararat just before Turkish attacks on Russian Black Sea ports. Early in November a British force landed in Mesopotamia, but no survey personnel were attached until the Survey of India responded to a request from General Nixon section by sending a small party in December 1914 under Colonel Pirrie to Basra to survey that city and its environs at a large scale (4-inches to the mile), by which time Basrah, Qurnah and the Shatt-al-Arab delta were occupied. The Turks had retired to a position at Ezra’s Tomb, 22 miles above Qurnah.

The maps available when the British force landed were:

1. Survey of India ½-inch degree sheets;
2. War Office 1:250,000 sheets;
3. Turkish period navigation map of Shatt-al-Arab and Tigris;
4. Sir William Willcocks’ irrigation maps and plans at various scales prepared for the Turkish Government; Many of the most useful at 1:50,000 were missing.
5. Turco — Persian Boundary Commission maps and triangulation charts.

The first 4-inch survey was of about 23 square miles of the palm belt area on both banks of the Shatt-al-Arab from the Quarantine Station to Qarmat Ali. This was a skeleton survey containing just enough detail to lay out camps, roads and defences.

Large-scale surveys (4 feet to the mile) were next made of the towns of Basrah and Ashar, with 16-inch surveys of their suburbs, and to anticipate possible advances of the force to Amarah and Nasiriyah the triangulation was extended to create a foundation for future surveys. Meanwhile 1-inch and ½-inch surveys of the Basrah area were being executed, the floods beginning in February 1915, isolating Muzairah and Qurnah and forcing the withdrawal of the garrisons to Qarmat Ali. The country south-west of Basrah was in places under 3 feet of water, interfering with survey work. Some often widely separated 1-inch and ½-inch surveys were completed near military camps. The heat and floods prevented further surveys at Qurnah, and all that could be done was to extend the 1-inch and smaller-scale surveys near Zubair and Shuaibah, to push it forward along the northern desert towards Chuwaibdah and Nukhailah, and to continue the surveys at the base.

In April 1915 the need to safeguard the Anglo-Persian oil supply, threatened by the unrest in Arabistan and Persia, led to a force being sent into Persian Arabistan, but ‘the maps of Arabistan were inaccurate and misleading, and before all the operations there, at this period, preliminary ground reconnaissance was a necessity.’ One surveyor therefore accompanied the force, equipped with the data and maps of the Turco — Persian Boundary Commission, and he stayed with it throughout the campaign.

In June the mirage and heat forced the Survey Section to be withdrawn to India, leaving two surveyors behind for essential work. In July 1915 Nasiriyah on the Euphrates was captured, and in September an advance was made towards Kut on the Tigris. By September 1915 Pirrie’s party included 2 RE officers, 3 provincial officers and 12 surveyors. In 1914-1916 operations were planned mainly on reconnaissance sketches and reports produced by selected officers under the orders of Col. W. H. Beach, the chief Intelligence Staff Officer. General Townshend, advancing towards Kut, was provided by 17 September 1915, at Sannaiyat, with a map and detailed information about the Turkish position which had resulted from Major Reilly’s air reconnaissance work. For the assault on Kut the operation order issued on 26 September was accompanied by a map prepared from air reconnaissance, which ‘gave a fair indication of the relative position of the different topographical features, but the wide variation of its magnetic bearings with those obtained by the Engineer officer [who guided the column] made it inadvisable to include any compass bearing in the orders issued to the column. . . At that time the Air Force in Mesopotamia had not got a really reliable compass for aeroplane work.’

The British advances extended the survey possibilities, and a programme was approved including the triangulation and detailed survey of the banks of the Shatt-al-Arab, Tigris and Euphrates, and extensions into adjoining deserts and swamps for operations and administration. Survey operations on the Karun river and Shatt-al-Hai were postponed, and the new work divided into 5 areas.

The ½-inch scale was chosen for field surveys in Mesopotamia and the adjacent areas of Arabia and Persia; these could be enlarged to 1-inch if necessary, and supplemented by larger-scale surveys in particular localities.

Survey work was started as soon as possible following the occupation of Kut, and all triangulation was completed as far as could be covered by daily escorts, but survey further afield was forbidden because of hostile Arabs. From a local base all imams, minarets and other prominent objects in the Kut area were fixed, and two surveyors made reconnaissance surveys by using supply boats travelling to Aziziyah. On 21 November 1915, Major Reilly was shot down at Ctesiphon and his sketch map of the Tigris from Diyala to Aziziyah proved of vital importance to the Turks, who troops had no maps at all, not even at their headquarters! On 21 November General Townshend issued a sketch map, prepared from air reconnaissance and ‘which gave a fairly accurate representation of the enemy’s entrenchments,’ with his operation orders for the following day’s battle.

Before the RFC was able to help the survey with air photography, reconnaissance and sketch maps were made with difficulty for the immediate use of troops at the front. Between February and June 1916 the compilation of sketch maps in the forward area was carried out under the GSO3 Maps of Tigris Corps HQ, who had no technical experience of survey or map reproduction. Map TC4, issued to troops with Tigris Corps Operation Order No.26 dated 6 March 1916, was compiled from:

1. Old pre-war small-scale maps of the river.
2. Sapper reconnaissances.
3. Air reports.
4. Sketches of the ground inland.

It was squared in a similar fashion to Western Front maps, with each numbered square being subdivided into four lower-case lettered squares (a — d), but within which 2-figure rectangular coordinates were given measured from the NW corner (as opposed to the south-west corner in France), with easting given first, then northing.

As air cooperation gradually became effective, and to provide the army with maps of the completely unsurveyed enemy-occupied areas, a Map Compilation Section was formed in June, to accompany the forward troops of the Tigris Corps during the attempt to relieve General Townshend’s force at Kut under Major C. P. Gunter from the Survey of India. The map series bore the designation ‘T.C.’ for Tigris Corps. As the work of the Section rapidly increased in technicality and value, it became necessary to associate it more closely with GHQ and the RFC. The Section compiled and printed the following map series:

1. Strategic and general geographical maps at ¼” (approx. 1:253,440) or smaller scales.
2. Topographical maps at ½” (1:126,720) or 1” (1:63,360) scales for military operations.
3. Operations maps at 3” (1:21,120) scale of actual or expected areas of attack or defence.
4. Trench maps at 6” (1:10,560) and 12” (1:5,280) scales.

These scales were fixed by Gunter and the Tigris Corps staff (and approximated to the standard scales used by the British Army in France, where for example the strategic map was 1:250,000, the tactical (movement) maps were 1:100,000 and 1:40,000, the general artillery map was 1:20,000, trench maps were 1:10,000 and special operations trench maps were 1:5,000). The infantry preferred the larger scale trench map since defences could be reproduced exactly as they appeared on photographic enlargements. On the 6” scale details of trenches, gun-pits and machine gun emplacements had to be conventionalised; however for artillery purposes, where both the British battery and target referencing mark positions (including aiming points) had to appear, the 12” scale was too cumbersome.

General Younghusband, pushing forward towards Kut in January 1916, found a complete lack of information about the Es Sinn position: ‘The British, though they had traversed this area before (and had turned the Turks in September 1915 out of the Es Sinn position) had no accurate knowledge of its topography. Evaporation and percolation at one season and rapid flooding at another render the area subject to much periodical change. Furthermore, the existing maps of the locality contained many shortcomings and the paucity of troops available for escorts (vitally necessary in those regions) had much restricted our own surveyors’ efforts to make these shortcomings good.’ Younghusband commented, ‘You cannot count on any marshes shown on the map at this season.’ Detail on the map was poorly positioned compared with the later survey maps — in one case the Turkish position was half-a-mile out!

In March 1916 the night march to the Dujaila Redoubt was planned on the reconnaissances of Captain K. Mason RE, who successfully guided the column. At Sannaiyat on 5 April it was noted that ‘The Turkish position proved to consist of a series of trenches which were nowhere in a continuous line nor as great in depth as had been shown on the British sketch maps . . . General Gorringe had gathered from his air reports that the Turks had no trenches on the extreme left of their Sannaiyat position . . . The sketch maps of the period showing the location of the Turkish trenches were not very accurate, but it seemed almost impossible for an attacking force to lose its way, as the main communication trench from Fallahiya alongside a flood embankment led directly into the Sannaiyat position. . . . At Fallahiya, much further loss of time was caused by the passage of the trenches, as the 21st Brigade staff was still imperfectly acquainted with the exact location and intricacies of these; and consequently, on at least one occasion, the 19th and 28th Brigades lost their way and had to counter-march. . . . A fresh trench map, issued on the 5th April as a result of the latest air reconnaissances, showed the distance [between the Fallahiya and Sannaiyat trenches] to be at least . . . a mile longer than it had been supposed to be when General Gorringe had given General Younghusband the orders for the attack. Subsequent experience showed that the longer distance was correct.

Air photography enabled all operations maps and maps of the Turkish trenches and battery positions to be compiled entirely from air photos, hung onto such fixed points as could be intersected. These were probably the first maps of this kind to be compiled without ground survey (except for the fixed points). The open and flat nature of the country enabled the compilers to produce accurate and up-to-date maps for use in every action from the autumn of 1916 onwards.

The start of trench warfare in front of Kut emphasised the need for maps of the Turkish rear areas, but the flat country, although it restricted the application of conventional ground survey beyond no man’s land, was ideal for air photography — there were no hills to distort the restitution. No aircraft were available early on, and even when they did arrive later they were not available for systematic air survey photography, involving level, straight flying. In April 1916, Capt. T. E. Lawrence of the Egyptian Intelligence, while on a visit to Mesopotamia, suggested the loan of a section to assist in the compilation of trench maps from air photos based on Gallipoli and Sinai experience. Ernest Dowson, Director General of the Survey of Egypt had been instrumental in creating such techniques. Lawrence’s offer was gladly accepted, but pending its arrival Gunter had to make the best use of the apparatus at his disposal and to develop his maps largely from first principles. Throughout the summer of 1916, maps of the Turkish positions were compiled using maps already produced by the Basrah Survey Party supplemented by air photos of the trenches taken at 6,000 feet. The need for systematic air photography of the Turkish lines resulted in a plane for air survey work being placed at Gunter’s disposal, but it was continually being withdrawn for other duties, sometimes for days at a time. A scheme for a regular series of maps was laid out and serially numbered, sheets being taken up in order of priority. This continued to be known as the ‘T.C.’ series even after the designation was changed to First Corps and the area of operations had extended to other fronts. Between September and December 1916 the RFC was very active, flying bombing, reconnaissance, photography and artillery cooperation missions. The Official History noted that ‘reconnaissance and photographic work were specially important, as accurate survey maps of the country bordering the Tigris beyond our front did not exist; and, to remedy this, large areas were photographed mile by mile and, from these photographs, maps were compiled.’

The triangulation was completed east and west of Amarah, and gradually brought up from Amarah to Shaikh Saad, but the hostility of the Arabs at this time prevented isolated survey detachments from working upstream from this point. The forward area of operations east of Kut was later also triangulated, and a subsidiary series observed to the Persian foothills. In the Kut area, air photo control was provided by Col. Pirrie’s triangulation, but this did not extend to the Suwadah lake area on the left bank of the Tigris, west of Sannaiyat, where another method of fixing points was evolved by Gunter who, with the artillery, invented a new method of fixing control points for air photos in enemy territory by simultaneously intersecting 6-inch howitzer shell bursts on the Sawadah position from four accurately fixed observation posts on the right bank of the Tigris (Maqasis Fort, Chahailah Mounds, near Bait Isa and Croftons Mound); an air observer registered the position of each burst on an air photo plan, the observed angles were then plotted and those marked ‘O.K.’ by the observer (one of three good intersections) were accepted as correct and their coordinates used for adjusting the photo-strips. By the end of October 1916 all the Turkish front from Sannaiyat to Shumran to a width of 5 miles from the Tigris had been mapped on the 3” scale. Trench maps of the Sannaiyat and Suwadah position had been prepared on the 6” scale, and another of the Sannaiyat system on the 12” scale. 120 square miles of country were mapped from air photos. These maps were kept up-to-date with correction and appliqué (updated portions of the map to be pasted on) slips.

In November 1916 the Map Compilation Section was moved to GHQ at ‘Arab Village’ and expanded into a complete Photo-Litho Section by the addition of a special Air Photo Section from Egypt (Lawrence’s suggestion) which came with full photo-equipment and a flatbed printing machine; it now had a full-size printing machine and several hand presses, manned by trained machine-printers and litho-draughtsmen recruited from New Army troops in India.

General Maude’s offensive of early 1917 broke the Turkish defence on 23 February, captured Kut and began the pursuit to Baghdad. Following a 120-mile advance during which map supply was maintained through the Section working day and night, Baghdad was occupied on 11 March 1917. Air supply was a feature of this advance, at one stage Turkish troops being chased off one map as an aeroplane dropped a bundle of the next sheet at Corps HQ. By 1917 the survey establishment had increased to 28 officers and 82 other ranks and remained at this level until after the armistice. Early in 1917 a Deputy Director of Surveys was authorised, Colonel Pirrie filling this post. In March he moved the HQ of the Survey from Basrah, formed the Survey Directorate at Baghdad. Although the BGGS(Intelligence), Mag.-Gen W. H. Beach, suggested that the Map Compilation Section should be amalgamated with the Survey Directorate, they remained separate. The Section moved to Baghdad soon after the occupation, finding a very suitable building where the underground
‘sardabs’ provided cool and dustless press rooms and in which an engine was installed for running the power-press.

Following the occupation of Baghdad, mapping was continued to the west, north and east, field triangulation being executed by surveyors of the Survey Directorate who supplied plane-table sheets or traces to the Map Compilation Section where ‘T.C.’ maps were rapidly produced for immediate issue to the troops. Survey work continued throughout the hot season in preparation for an anticipated Turkish counter-offensive.

The Official Historian noted the deficient cartography of the region:
‘Baghdad itself was a difficult position to hold as it was lacking in natural and artificial defences, and several main routes converged on it by which the enemy could advance and attack us. Moreover, in the vicinity to the north and north-west, military movement was much hampered by a network of canals and irrigation cuts, over which there were few bridges, and by the lack of good communications. Owing to the inaccuracy of our available maps, this fact was not, however, fully realised till it had been proved by actual experience.' Further, the weak position of the British forces there in March 1917 meant that long distance reconnaissance flights on the Euprates, Tigris and Diyala fronts were necessary,
‘and the only available maps, very inaccurate and frequently on a small scale, did not make these any easier.’

The poor maps caused tactical problems during operations, and delayed the making of battle appreciations and attack plans; General Cobbe’s column, advancing on Hassaiwa on 14 March 1917, found that
‘as the actual distance between the Tigris and the railway was much greater than was shown on the map, it seemed probable that the enemy’s position was farther off than had been expected.’ Information was then received
‘that the enemy was holding a position extending from the river to the railway, apparently about three miles south of Mushahida, but his right flank had not been located. Other reports of this position could not be reconciled with the map, on which it was found that the railway was shown three miles farther east than it actually was; and a rough sketch drawn about 9 a.m. by pilots and observers of two aeroplanes led to the belief that the position was much nearer than was really the case.’ The strong mirage also created observation problems, making it difficult to judge distances.

During the main operations small survey detachments, varying in strength from 3 officers and 6 other ranks to individuals, made expeditions involving courage and initiative. In May 1918, during the preparatory period for the advance on Kifri, there was no opportunity to do the necessary air photography for an operation map, so Major G. A. Beazeley took up a sketch-surveying board which he had invented equipped with a sun-azimuth dial and completed in a morning a sketch map from the air of the Turkish positions in front of Kifri, sending it on to the Map Compilation Section by air the same day. Copies were printed and flown to the troops the next morning in time for the advance and capture of Kifri that day. Beazeley was later shot down and captured while carrying out a similar task in front of Kirkuk.

Between June 1916 and November 1918 the Map Compilation Section printed 931,441 maps, covering 103,840 (or 143,983) square miles at various scales. Of this area, 2,263 square miles, and 120 map sheets, were mapped from air photos. At the larger artillery and tactical operations scales of 3”, 6” and 12”, 180,211 copies were printed in one, two or three colours.

AFRICA.
By the outbreak of the war, parts of Africa had been cursorily mapped, but only in a primitive sense of compilations from colonial administration reconnaissance mapping and travellers’ reports; these sources had been supplemented in a few cases, as a result of the late-19th Century European
‘scramble for Africa,’ by the detailed topographical mapping by international boundary commissions of inter-colonial boundaries. German territories were covered by fair medium scale (1:100,000 to 1:300,000) series produced by the Colonial Ministry, and the British War Office had reproduced these. Since 1906 the British Colonial Survey Committee had laid down guidelines for standard-scale mapping of all Africa. The first maps produced as a result of this programme, notably those at 1:Million and 1:Two Million published by GSGS, were used as strategic overview maps. The Germans used similar small-scale Übersichtkarten.

There were many British officers and men of the Royal Engineers engaged on survey work in Africa at the outbreak of war in August 1914. They all returned immediately to other duties except for Major L. N. F. I. King (who in 1917-18 commanded the Depot Field Survey Company/Battalion in France), in charge of the Kenya Survey Department and Captain P. J. Macksey on the West Coast. The three minor campaigns in Africa — the East Coast, the Cameroons and Togoland — were conducted in similar geographical conditions. Few Europeans knew the countries and there were no reliable maps. Survey of necessity took the form either of reconnaissance and hasty route-sketching, done by Ordnance Survey NCOs (hitherto mainly officers’ work), or of the gradual improvement of existing maps. Unlike other theatres, there were very few occasions when any more accurate data were required for the direction of artillery fire. The mobility of the operations in extremely difficult terrain resulted in little more than time and distance diagrams being produced; there was little new rigorous survey or mapping.

East Africa.
Major King stayed in East Africa to attempt to make a junction between the Kenya triangulation and the German survey triangulations of the northern highlands of Tanganyika, and of the Boundary Commissions which had demarcated the Kenya — German East Africa Frontier. The existing unreliable German 1:300,000 map of German East Africa was ‘squared’ for reference use and printed by the GSGS in London; it should be noted here that the Official History of the campaign contains many references to the unreliability of the maps used in this theatre. A South African Topographical Section began reconnaissance and compass-sketching, but suffered from inexperience and disease and did no effective work from July 1916, when No. 6 Topographical Section RE under Captain E. K. Boileau, which had been raised at the OS, Southampton, on 1 March 1916, arrived from England, disembarking at Mombassa.

‘B’ Army Printing Section RE was raised at the School of Military Engineering at Chatham on 1 March 1916 under 2nd Lieut. R. Peel and sailed from Southampton with No. 6 Section on 25 May 1916, arriving at Kiliudini where they both joined the East Africa Expeditionary Force, being attached to Advanced GHQ. Boileau’s Section was divided almost immediately into reconnaissance staffs for the three divisional columns. No regular mapping was done, due to rapid movement and lack of fixed points. The surveyors were able to keep their columns located on the 1:300,000 map, and make occasional more detailed area sketches — for example at Morogoro, Dar-es-Salaam, Kilwa and Lindi. They also sketched tsetse fly belts to warn transport columns. Boileau was killed by a sniper on 18 October 1917 while reconnoitring on Nakade Ridge.

In 1918 the small personnel available were found inadequate for the necessary sketching, compilation of rough maps and printing (mainly sun-printing). The Survey of India therefore sent a party of 6 skilled plane-tablers under Lieut. A. J. A. Drake, who took over command of No. 6 Topo Section. The next stages of the campaign were in Portugese East Africa, for which no reasonably reliable map existed. The Section continued to supply route maps and to act as topographical guides. In October 1918, No. 6 Section and the Indian Detachment embarked at Dar-es-Salaam for England and India respectively.

The cartographic and other records of this campaign suffered from the fact that units were not very conscientious about keeping war diaries and submitting operations reports. It should be noted that Volume II of the Official History of the East African campaign was not published, but the author’s papers and unfinished drafts are in the PRO at CAB 44, pieces 4 — 10.

West Africa.
British survey parties were active at the outbreak of war on the west coast of Africa, demarcating frontiers and mapping mining concessions. The rank and file knew the country, particularly its frontier regions, as well as any other British officials, and were immediately used as guides and route-sketchers. For example, Corporal William O’Connor had been at work in the northern territories of the Gold Goast, and had also been mapping the Gold Coast — Togoland boundary. On the outbreak of war Captain Macksey, appointed reconnaissance officer to the Togoland Field Force, sent O’Connor (a good horseman) to find the French Field Force then assembling in Timbuctoo, and to guide it either through British territory or direct into Togoland as occasion might demand. He carried this out with judgement and success, being awarded the DCM.

Meanwhile, the officers of the various survey parties were sent back to England or were employed in the Western African Expeditionary Force on other duties, and the other ranks were recalled from their reconnaissance duties to form the Works Department at Duala under Major Clough. Their special skills proved useful throughout the campaign, Clough combining the correction and sun-printing of the few existing maps with his other duties, and many of the other ranks being used as guides for road and railway construction parties. The West African campaign ended in March 1916, and officers and men were sent back to England. During the campaign, captured German maps proved very useful, a captured railway map even being used for directing artillery fire!

South West Africa.
The operations conducted by the forces of the Union of South Africa suffered throughout from a completely inadequate supply of maps. The need for good maps was not appreciated at DHQ, perhaps because many of those in South Africa responsible for organising operations were already very familiar with the country, and could not appreciate why others might need them. The original supply of maps was very small, and they were so poor as to be of little use. A Topographical Section for field work, already assembled and available, was applied for in the Northern Force at Pretoria during its organisation. Despite the fact that such a Section was needed both for its immediate operational utility and its value in recording South Africa’s war experiences through providing full topographical records for instruction purposes, it was refused on the grounds that transport had to be reduced to a minimum; in fact there were only 4 personnel and one scotch cart! A further urgent request from the field resulted in the Section being sent up, but its late arrival meant that the lack of mapping material throughout the brief campaign limited the issue of maps to senior officers only; moreover, valuable data remained unrecorded.

© Peter Chasseaud 2002

© 2002 Naval & Military Press

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